Type 88 Anti-Ship Missiles for the Philippine Military?

The activities that have taken place during the Joint Exercise Balikatan 2026 introduced a lot of first instances that are unthinkable in the previous iteration of the annually conducted exercise, as a new active participant of the exercise deploy their coastal-based anti-ship missile platform, that might improve the capabilities of the Philippine Armed Forces, especially on the period where arms sales from this country likely getting expanded in the upcoming years.

FOR THE FIRST TIME

A Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force Type 88 surface to ship missile launched from its launcher during the Sinking Exercise phase of the Joint Exercise Balikatan 2026.
From the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS).

Every year, both the Philippines and the United States, along with other countries that have either taken part in a limited capacity or on an observer status, engaged in a primarily bilateral exercise between allied nations that are usually taking place at around April and May of every year. 

This refers to the Joint Exercise Balikatan, whereby both countries, along with others taking part, get an opportunity that involves interoperability of new capabilities, camaraderie, exchanges of subject expertise, among others.

But the 2026 iteration of the exercise provided a primary opportunity for another country to take part in this activity, alongside Filipino and American troops that are part of what counts as a routine bilateral exercise conducted annually. 

For the first time, the Japan Self-Defense Force or JSDF took part in this Joint Exercise, whereby they showcase existing capabilities in their inventory, aside from actually deploying its troops and equipment in the country for the first time since the Second World War. 

The first time participation took place when both the Philippine and Japanese governments signed and ratified the Reciprocal Access Agreement or RAA in 2024 and 2025 respectively, enabling the militaries of both the Philippines and Japan to get deployed on both countries’ territorial domain, particularly emphasizing more on military exercises such as the Joint Exercise Balikatan where like-minded nations take the opportunity of improving the needed interoperability between the militaries of both nations.

With that first time also comes another opportunity for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to field its coastal-based anti-ship missile system, whereby they take part on the sinking exercise (SINKEX) phase of the entire joint exercise, involving the former Philippine Navy vessel the BRP Quezon (PS-70), an Auk-class minesweeper during the Second World War where it served as a patrol corvette within the naval service branch until its decommissioning in 2021.

In sinking, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force fielded the Type 88 anti-ship missile system, whereby a launcher unit fired at least two (2) missiles in a salvo, effectively hitting the former BRP Quezon as a target during the sinking exercise phase. 

This resulted in extensive damage inflicted on the decommissioned Second World War ship, which effectively showcased the capabilities of the Japanese-made anti-ship missile, which then made the said ship sink into the depths of the sea off the coast of Western Luzon.

This resulted for the Armed Forces of the Philippines to express interest on the Japanese-made anti-ship missile system and other systems in Balikatan 2026, all of it will help improve the capabilities of the country’s defense capabilities, coming alongside the interoperability between nations that took part on the Joint Exercise as intertwining military hardware use helps multiply the needed deterrence that the country needs amidst the aggression imposed by the northwestern neighbor in the West Philippine Sea.

It also gives Japan the consideration of exporting the Type 88 anti-ship missile platform to the Philippines, after its outstanding success in sinking the BRP Quezon during the Joint Exercise Balikatan 2026. This development gives the increasing prospect that the Armed Forces of the Philippines might get this anti-ship missile platform aside from the reported transfer of the Abukuma-class Destroyer Escorts to the Philippine Navy, both of which will boost the country’s maritime defense prospects.

THE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

The Type 80 anti-ship missile munition, originally designed as an aircraft-launched warhead, became the basis for the development of the truck-based Type 88 surface to ship missile.
From Wikimedia Commons.

In the 1980s, at the time that the Abukuma-class destroyer escorts were being built for the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries or MHI developed the Type 88 anti-ship missiles, which itself is a land-based version of the air-launched Type 80 (ASM-1) anti-ship missile. 

Mounted onboard trucks like the ones Japan deployed during the Joint Exercise Balikatan, its excellent performance still reflects relevance even for a late 1980s-era missile technology incorporated at its time.

This likely come as Japan’s attempt at creating and expanding its indigenous missile production, whereby a ship-based variant of the Type 88 also got developed during the period, intended for integration onboard the warships belonging to Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force or JMSDF, such as the Murasame-class destroyers and Akizuki-class destroyers, which is the Type 90 anti-ship missile. For context, the Abukuma-class destroyer escorts originally came with Harpoon anti-ship missiles installed.

Since its development in the 1980s, the Type 88 and the multitude of anti-ship missile iterations that Japan developed became the backbone of the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ missile capability, coupled with its domestic industry which primarily focuses more on developing and producing military technology that is only limited for its own use, as the government’s pacifist policy prevented any transfer or sale of military hardware, until just recently with the relaxation of restrictions imposed to this prospect.

The Philippine Armed Forces’ interest in the Type 88 surface to ship missile platform presents an opportunity, taking a deep understanding regarding its capabilities by examining its specifications as presented in this detailed entry here. At a glance, the Type 88 missile, as a truck-launched based platform, comes with a mass of 661 kilograms, a length of 5.08 meters, a diameter of 350 millimeters, and a warhead weighing at around 225 kilograms of high explosive round that has the capability of sinking a ship.

Going on its trajectory performance, the Type 88 missile gets propelled by a Mitsubishi TMJ2 turbojet engine and a single solid rocket booster as it gets launched from its truck launcher, giving out an operational range of around 180 kilometers and a low, skimming flight altitude of just 5-6 meters. 

Going further, it has a maximum speed of 1,150 kilometers per hour, which is almost reaching the speed of Mach 1 (1,238 kilometers), and has an onboard inertial guidance and terminal active radar homing system.

In comparison, the SSM-700K ‘Haeseong’ C-Star anti–ship missile that the Philippine Navy employs onboard both the Jose Rizal-class and Miguel Malvar-class of guided missile frigates comes with a warhead weighing at around 250 kilograms, while the entire missile’s mass comes at around 718 kilograms, which is heavier compared to the Japanese Type 88 missile. The C-Star’s size is 5.46 meters and a diameter of 340 millimeters, which makes it longer than the said Japanese-made missile.

With the speeds coming at 1,010 kilometers per hour and operational range of around 150 to 320 kilometers, the C-Star missile as Philippine Navy’s ship-based weaponry comes hand-in-hand with the coastal-based anti-ship missile features brought by the Type 88 surface to ship missile system from Japan as part of the broader push for a sufficient anti-access area denial (A2/AD) layer in areas of concern like in the northern and western parts of mainland Luzon.

TYPE 88 SUCCESSOR IN JSDF SERVICE

Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Type 12 surface-to-ship missile.
Image Source.

Interest in the Type 88 surface to ship missile platform by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and its successful firing during the Joint Exercise Balikatan 2026 comes alongside the ongoing capability upgrades that are taking place within the Japan Self-Defense Force, one that served as an impetus to this development relative to the purported sale of the 1980s-era missile munitions to the Philippines. This refers to the development and deployment of their Type 25 surface to ship missile.

Being a hypersonic missile in itself, the Type 25 surface to ship missile serves as a continuous missile development path that the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force undertake for its truck-launched platform, and the third succeeding missile type that followed both the Type 88 and Type 12 surface to missile platform. Being an upgrade over the Type 12 surface to missile platform, the Type 25 surface to ship missile has the capability of destroying targets well within its 1,000-kilometer range.

Before the Type 25 surface to ship missile’s introduction into the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s array of missiles capable of striking naval targets that threaten the Japanese home islands, they maintain the Type 12 surface to ship missiles which count as a successor to the older Type 88 missiles, with the latter likely getting phased out from the Japanese military stocks and, if pushed through, will help improve the capabilities of the Philippine Armed Forces alongside its BrahMos and C-Star anti-ship missiles.

In terms of capabilities, the Type 25 surface-to-ship missile exhibits a leap in technological advantages, especially when compared to the Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles that originally came from the late 1980s. Aside from its reported range of around 1,000 kilometers, the Type 25 actually has at least two (2) variants, one of which being an upgraded variant of the legacy Type 12 SSM, while the other being the hyper velocity gliding projectiles (HGVP) missile variant.

Completing the link between the Type 25 surface to ship missile to the Type 88 that the Armed Forces of the Philippines might likely get in this case, is the Type 12 surface to ship missile, where procurement of the said missile took place in 2012, and its deployment happened two (2) years later, in 2014. 

Like the Type 88, this missile is also a development made by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries for Japan Ground Self-Defense Force requirements, emphasizing the capability evolution exhibited by Japanese technology for its defense.

Going through its technical specifications, the Type 12 surface to ship missile’s size comes with its 350mm diameter width, 5 meters length, overall weight of around 700 kilograms, range of 200 kilometers, and a maximum speed of 1,111 kilometers per hour. 

It kept ‌most of its size as compared to the Type 88 surface to ship missile, along with the overall projectile speed of the newer version of the missile, although the Type 12 is heavier compared to the 661-kilogram mass of the Type 88. 

What technically differentiates the Type 12 surface to ship missile compared to its older Type 88 predecessor is the onboard systems configuration, whereby the former comes with an advanced guidance system that will provide enhanced precision against its intended target. Specifically, it comes with a guided launcher, fire control device, relay device, and GPS-based updated guidance system.

THE EXPORT PROSPECT

The Philippine Navy will receive the Abukuma-class destroyer escorts as part of the deal between the Philippine and Japanese governments.
From Wikimedia Commons, shared through an article source.

The Philippine Armed Forces’ desire to secure Type 88 surface to ship missiles from Japan and the Japanese’ interest in providing them to the Philippines goes beyond the technical specifications and the firepower-building capabilities of the Philippine Armed Forces as part of its own ongoing modernization push, whereby it presented a multitude of firsts for both sides relative to this development, along with the set of agreements and policies from the governments of the said countries that have made this possible.

For both Japan and the Philippines, the exporting of the Type 88 surface to ship missiles comes with multiple milestones that have come with this move - for one, the Philippines might likely be the first overseas user and the other one aside from Japan that operates and maintains the said Japanese-made missile technology from the 1980s shall this export pushes through. This also entails the first export for the Japanese relating to missile technology since its lifting of arms export restrictions in April.

Speaking of the lifting of arms export restrictions made by Japan, this actually refers to the revisions made to the country’s three principles on equipment transfers and their implementation guidelines, which serves as the primary policy paper of the Japanese government that justify its need of transferring and sale export of its military hardware, of which it now includes the same intended for lethal military hardware, which were previously prohibited before the approved revisions.

For the Philippine Armed Forces, this will mean having three (3) types of anti-ship missiles in active service, alongside the Indian-made BrahMos missiles and the South Korean-made SSM-700K Haeseong ‘C-Star’ Missile, and the second (2nd) coastal, ground-based missile launching solution, alongside the aforementioned Indian-made missiles. The export of Japanese-made missiles helps expand the coastal defense capabilities of the Philippines and its deterrence on a broader scale.

In this purported export of the Type 88 surface to ship missiles from Japan to the Philippines, this also paves the way for both countries to take any future export of newer missile variants that Japan currently has in service, most notably both the Type 12 and the recently introduced Type 25 missiles that will probably replace the old, 1980s-era missile system that became the primary premise of the exports. This is important as the Philippine military also looks at other options like the NSM-armed NMESIS system.

Aside from the Type 88 surface to ship missiles, the Armed Forces of the Philippines also has the interest in the Abukuma-class Destroyer Escorts, of which recent reports from a Japanese outlet suggest that the Philippine Navy will probably get at least five (5) out of six (6) destroyer escorts as part of its fleet expansion planning, going alongside ongoing purchase of both the Rajah Sulayman-class Offshore Patrol Vessels and the repeat order of Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigates.

All the mentioned export prospects relative to the Type 88 missile, destroyer escort transfer to the Philippine Navy, and the upgrading of Philippine-Japanese defense ties into a full Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, gives added support to the foundation of not only reinforcing the resolve of both countries as an important component of the first island chain, but also increasing of support for the country’s defense supply chains, joining the likes of South Korea in providing defense material support to the Philippines.

LOOKING FORWARD

The decommissioned BRP Quezon after being hit by a Type 88 missile during the Sinking Exercise (SINKEX) phase of the Joint Exercise Balikatan 2026.

As the bilateral defense relations between the Philippines and Japan improve, along with the multitude of factors that refers to the relaxation of arms exports and the Type 25 missile’s first deployment within the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force or JGSDF, makes the export of Type 88 surface to ship missiles an ideal one for the Armed Forces of the Philippines to consider, with both the Philippine Army and the Philippine Marine Corps being the primary beneficiary of this development if it pushes through.

The capabilities of the said 1980s-era developed Japanese-made missile showcased during the first mainstream involvement of the Japan Self-Defense Force in the 2026 Joint Exercise Balikatan, whereby it successfully targeted the decommissioned World War 2 era corvette, a success that caught the attention of the Philippine military leadership where its capabilities, if bought, transferred, and secured in numbers, adds strength to the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy of the country.

Currently, at the time this article gets published, the purported export of Type 88 surface to ship missiles to the Philippines from existing Japanese Self-Defense Force stocks is still at the talking level, although the assessment comes is once the deal pushes through, its delivery will come with phases, parallel to the entry of additional Type 25 missile launchers and munitions in the Japanese military service - a process that will take years until the entire transition gets completed.

Even with the plans for Type 88 surface to ship missiles for the Philippines made rounds in the country’s multiple defense communities and spaces, this might likely not stop the Armed Forces of the Philippines into seeking other anti-ship missiles available in the market, aside from an ensured supply chain associated with the most likely repeat orders of both the BrahMos and SSM-700K ‘Haeseong’ C-Star missile, both are already serving in the Philippine Navy’s weaponry arsenal.

As the planned export of Type 88 surface to ship missiles from Japan to the Philippines is still at the discussion level, that are likely to come as part of the improving defense ties between both countries as part of the newly forged Comprehensive Strategic Partnership cemented by the approved Reciprocal Access Agreement ratified by both governments, its overall direction might still change, especially in whether the entire plan pushes through, in the numbers involved, and in the process of transferring the said materials.

Still, the entire discussion presented for this type of missile system that might get introduced in the Armed Forces of the Philippines gives a promising prospect, a positive note even, that there is an opportunity open for the military leadership to further improve the expanded capabilities of all the service branches of the organization, even in the note that the procurement plans and programs of the Revised AFP Modernization Program is still actively ongoing and in process.

Ultimately, this development is something worth looking forward to, especially with the firepower benefits it presents for the Philippine military to get its hands on as it continuously expands its territorial defense deterrence under the Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept or CADC umbrella. Admittedly, the Armed Forces of the Philippines have achieved so far for its territorial defense, with the Type 88 surface to ship missiles will help add to that achievement even further.

(c) 2026 PDA.

Published from a station in Eastern Visayas. 

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Discussing the Philippine Army's Additional 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (PGM Ready) Project

As the other service branches of the Philippine Armed Forces expand their capabilities, such as in the case for the Philippine Navy's additional naval vessels and the Philippine Air Force's never-ending pursuit in securing its comprehensive multi-role fighter jet package, the Philippine Army continues to expand its existing capability, with this one revolving around the increase of its self-propelled howitzers in service.

AS REPORTED IN THE 2025 DND PROCUREMENT MONITORING REPORT (PMR)

The Ceasar MKII self-propelled howitzer from KNDS (formerly Nexter) is among the likely candidates of the Philippine Army's additional self-propelled howitzer project.
Image gathered from the KNDS website.

On the previous two (2) projects discussed regarding the additional Miguel Malvar-class frigate and additional anti-submarine warfare helicopters of the Philippine Navy, its primary source of information originated from the same report presented on the transparency section of the Department of National Defense’s own website for the 2nd half of 2025, as this is always a routine among government agencies to post their respective procurement monitoring reports, done by semesters within a fiscal year.

Still on that same report, the Department of National Defense presented a single acquisition project intended for the Philippine Army, one that will help increase the number of self-propelled howitzers active within the service branch. 

Currently, the Philippine Army maintains at least twelve (12) ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzers made by the Israeli firm Elbit Systems, the same manufacturer that provides military hardware to the service branch, such as the Sabrah light tank.

The interest in the Philippine Army’s self-propelled howitzer platform speaks volumes for its satisfactory performance as used by the service branch’s artillery personnel in terms of its field use, as its shoot and scoot feature gives quicker response time for the troops to provide artillery support on the ground at a shortest time possible, while reducing the risk for the personnel in getting caught from a counterattack, as the platform can get pulled out from its area of concern.

While getting a platform from the same source is an excellent way to go in terms of logistical aspects of operating and maintaining it, other factors are at play that might prompt the planners at the high level to consider other candidates that will help complement the capability and key features for a self-propelled howitzer. This point of concern comes as the discussions on this topic will delve deep into the path this acquisition project will proceed.

Aside from the logistical concerns involving the supplier of the ATMOS 2000 to the Philippine Army, part of the discussion will also cover the preferable candidates for the additional orders made for a self-propelled howitzer platform, whereby multiple references will provide the likely preferable one that the planners of the service branch to consider, as this will help factor in the satisfiable end-user requirements relative to the overall thrust of the service branch under the Revised AFP Modernization Program.

'NOT A REPEAT ORDER OF THE ATMOS 2000 SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER'

The Philippine Army maintains at least twelve (12) total ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer pieces.
Image (c) Army Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army (via Wikimedia Commons)

From a logistical point of view, the purchase of additional self-propelled howitzer units for the Philippine Army will give more sense, especially if this project comes with the order of additional ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer units from Israel’s Elbit Advanced Systems, especially that the service branch already has this type in inventory, and the personnel already having the experience on gaining needed skills relative to its operational, maintenance, and repair requirements.

However, the ongoing situation in the Middle East, which stemmed out from a 2023 conflict that involves the country of Israel itself against the aggression waged by a Palestinian-based group named Hamas, makes the supply chain situation worse, whereby the Israeli defense industrial production takes its country’s military supply needs first before exported products, which affects any prospect that the Philippine Military has in securing Israeli-made weapons like the ATMOS 2000 SPH.

This only got further exacerbated by the silent policy shift from the Philippine government in avoiding established Israeli suppliers like Elbit and Rafael Advanced Systems inexplicably, where the other factor, aside from the supply chain stretch that came as the result of the ongoing conflict that the country has with Hamas, points to the Israeli government’s lack of support to the Philippines’ sovereignty over the West Philippine Sea, especially on both the Kalayaan Island Group and Panatag Shoal.

The backlog that came as the result from the increase in demand for Israeli-made military hardware, especially by the Israeli Defense Force itself, coupled with the not-so-warm reception from the Israeli government in supporting the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea, makes any future military deals with Israeli-based companies a bit of undesirable for the Philippine Armed Forces to consider, likely resulting for the Philippine government through the Department of National Defense to seek other supplier options.

With this primary basis coming into consideration, the Philippine Army’s additional self-propelled howitzer program is now open for other prospective military suppliers to take part in the project. 

With this new procurement deal that will probably not be a repeat order of ATMOS 2000 that is already in service within the service branch, this paves the way for interesting self-propelled howitzer designs that will probably have its way into the hands of the country’s troops, providing artillery support in the battlefield.

THE NEW CANDIDATES OF THE PROJECT

One of the self-propelled howitzer platforms included in the shortlist is the Excalibur Army's DITA 155mm artillery platform.
Image Source.

With the idea of just buying additional ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer out of the picture, this paves the way for the Philippine Army into seeking different platforms that will complement the Israeli-made artillery pieces already in service, in a manner that it comes with the same performance that the end-user seeks for a self-propelled howitzer, while securing the assurance of timely delivery and an unhampered supply chain that is not affected by any military affairs its host country undertake.

There are at least two (2) platforms that are in the shortlist of what will be the next self-propelled howitzer of the Philippine Army, after Israel’s shortcomings in both the diplomatic and material support front as the Department of National Defense’s desire in improving its materials supply chain limiting to like-minded partners that support the government’s official stance in the West Philippine Sea. These are the Czech-made DITA 155mm SPH and the French-made KNDS CAESAR SPH.

Do take note that while both of the platforms aforementioned are in the shortlist by the Department of National Defense as reported, the details might still change from the time this article publishes as negotiations and the entire procurement process itself is ongoing, with changes on the shortlist might even happen and likely getting narrowed down to the preferred platform by the Philippine Army as the end-user. In this topic, the shortlist will cover the said two platforms, all for the sake of this discussion.

The DITA 155mm self-propelled howitzer is a Czech-made artillery product made by Excalibur Army, the same entity that should have supplied the Pandur II 8x8 armored vehicle chassis for the wheeled variant of the Sabrah Tank under the Philippine Army’s Light Tank Acquisition Project. As marketed, it sports a 155mm NATO caliber barrel, capable of firing artillery rounds of this size while having a maximum firing range of around thirty-nine (39) kilometers.

Compared to the ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer that the Philippine Army currently has in its inventory, the Excalibur DITA has the advantage with its automatic gun aiming along with its armored, air-conditioned cab with a filtration unit. The howitzer cannon of this platform acts as a gun turret, effectively providing artillery support at a wider angle while coming with an onboard guiding system that gives helpful analytics for an effective fire effect results of the Czech-made artillery piece’s salvo.

Such technological advancement for a self-propelled howitzer will be new for the Philippine Army’s personnel if it gets chosen, as this complicates the skills needed to operate, maintain, and overhaul this artillery throughout its service life, with the learning curve going steeper for the personnel who have the skills and experience operating and maintaining the current ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer currently active within the Philippine Army service.

This leaves the second shortlisted platform to be likely the preferable platform that the leadership within the Philippine Army and the Department of National Defense to consider, as the French-made self-propelled howitzer shared most of the operational and maintenance principles to the Israeli-made system where the steep learning curve will probably lessen as familiarity between the ATMOS 2000 and this system will help the service branch in considering this platform.

THE CLOSEST ONE TO THE ATMOS 2000 HOWITZER SETUP

The KNDS CAESAR self-propelled howitzer is one of the shortlisted candidates of the Philippine Army's self-propelled howitzer acquisition project.
Image Source.

The said competitor to the Excalibur Army’s DITA 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer solution is the KNDS CAESAR SPH, in which it is basically similar to the ATMOS 2000 in terms of its artillery configuration, with the howitzer basically fitted on a truck chassis and the ending tip of the artillery aimed to the front of the unit rather than the rotating turret configuration that came with the Czech-made self-propelled howitzer. This configuration gives it an advantage in terms of operational skills and experience-based familiarity.

Like both the DITA 155mm SPH and the ATMOS 2000, the KNDS CAESAR SPH also comes with a 155mm barrel, basically sharing munitions standards across the said platforms that ensures the interoperability of each system in firing the standard 155mm/52 caliber ordnance. The said standardized caliber ordnance for artillery rounds counts as a NATO standard that countries like the Philippines usually follow relative to the firearm calibers used by the armed forces, such as the 5.56mm NATO ammunition standard.

Developed in the 1990s by KNDS predecessor GIAT (Groupement des Industries de l'Armée de Terre) at the time it was a defense entity fully controlled by the French government, the CAESAR self-propelled howitzer has since then become widely used by multiple militaries across the world, which included the French armed forces itself. In Southeast Asia, the operators of this self-propelled howitzer include the countries of Thailand and Indonesia, with the former also possessing the Israeli-made ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer.

This means that for the Philippines, having the KNDS CAESAR self-propelled howitzer helps not only on a smoother and less steep learning curve for the Philippine Army personnel who have the experience in operating and maintaining the ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer from Israel’s Elbit Systems, but also having the benefit of an abundant source of spare parts resource with its number of users, lessening the stress on the country’s logistical chain for maintenance and overhaul purposes.

With its similarity in mind, there are chances that the Philippine Army will consider the French-made self-propelled howitzer system for its expanded capability use for this specialized type of artillery fitted on a vehicle for shoot and scoot operations, although the DITA 155mm self-propelled howitzer solution made by Excalibur Army comes with its own advantage, as its howitzer turret mount comes as a capability plus that expands its circular target area radius as compared to the competition.

IN SUMMARY

Any of the two (2) preferred self-propelled howitzers will complement the current ATMOS 2000 in service.
Image (c) Army Artillery Regiment, Philippine Army (via Wikimedia Commons)

The Philippine Army’s acquisition plan regarding the additional 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer (PGM Ready) Project is simply one part of the service branch’s ongoing efforts into expanding its firepower capability, which coincides with the wider push by the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines to further modernize its capabilities that align to territorial defense posture. This acquisition project entails the organization’s enhancement of coastal-based defense bombardment capability.

Currently, the said service branch possesses at least twelve (12) units of the ATMOS 2000 self-propelled howitzer pieces from Israel’s Elbit Systems Ltd, until a government policy makes the prospect of buying additional units of this type of self-propelled howitzer a less-preferable choice to take. Hence, the tender for this project is now open for other prospective suppliers to secure the contract, hoping that the winning supplier will take a piece of the country’s national defense market.

This push, with the Israel-made self-propelled howitzer now out of the picture, enabled the Philippine Army to get this project with two (2) shortlisted candidates that might get its way into the service branch’s inventory, which as the Excalibur Army DITA 155mm self-propelled howitzer from Czechia, versus the KNDS CAESAR 155mm self-propelled howitzer from France. Each of the presented offers came with its advantages and disadvantages that might entice the end-user to consider each offer.

In terms of interoperability and having a flatter learning curve for existing ATMOS 2000 crew, the French KNDS CAESAR 155mm self-propelled howitzer presented itself at this advantage, as it shares similar artillery fitting design to the Israeli-made one that the Philippine Army currently operates, hastening the integration process for the platform should the end-user choose it as its preferable platform. Meanwhile, the turreted howitzer solution of the DITA 155mm is a marketed feature for Excalibur Army.

Ultimately, the Philippine Army will expand its self-propelled howitzer capability in terms of numbers fielded and overall firepower projection regardless of which platform gets chosen, as this supports the expanded capability of the service branch relative to its mandated duties and responsibilities in ensuring the preservation of the country’s sovereignty and freedom of its populace, all of which are important push for the security and defense of the entire republic from both domestic and foreign threats. 

(c) 2026 PDA.

Published from a station in Eastern Visayas. 

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Philippine Defense Budget in 2026 as Explained

The Philippine government enacted the 2026 General Appropriations Act, which includes portions of the country's defense budget for the said year. As always, the figures presented for the defense budget in this calendar year as compared to previous years will come as a presentation of the current trends that also correlate to the urgency of the country's overall policy for its national security, especially with the challenges that external forces pose against the territorial integrity of the Filipino Nation.

OVERVIEW

The 2026 General Appropriations Act funds all projects of the government for the said year.
That includes the ones under the Revised AFP Modernization Program.

On January 5, 2026, President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr.‌ signed Republic Act 12314, more commonly known by many as the 2026 General Appropriations Act, into law. This enacted law, at a glance, defines the allotments provided by the national government through the recommendations set by the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) after collating the plans and programs presented by various agencies, which then undertook budget deliberations at the legislative level before it got the presidential signature.

Amounting to Php 6.793 trillion, the law provides authorization to all government agencies and instrumentalities to use the budget according to their set plans and programs as defined by their various annual procurement plans or APP, as governed by respective procurement, accounting, and auditing rules and regulations set at the time this article got published, especially the recently enacted Republic Act 12009 or the New Government Procurement Act (NGPA).

As the law now takes its course as being under implementation all throughout the year 2026 plus the subsequent continuing appropriations validity of the 2026 General Appropriations Act extended to the year 2027 in terms of obligations for MOOE and Capital Outlay, giving an in-depth look on the allotments provided to the Department of National Defense, including those under the Revised AFP Modernization Program, provides a picture that entails changes and developments on the presented figures.

Of course, the defense budget deliberations also came with scrutiny, especially with calls within the halls of the legislative bodies relating to un-programmed appropriations, along with the calls of the Department of National Defense on provisions regarding to the flexible financing options that might enable them to undertake contracts and other deals that entail the expansion of the capabilities provided to the Armed Forces of the Philippines as aligned to the Republic Act 10349 or the Revised AFP Modernization Law.

For this topic, the discussion will not only cover the figures relating to the allotments provided to the Defense Department for the fiscal period of 2026, but also to cover other matters relating to the defense budget during the deliberation, the calls for minimizing the need of including un-programmed appropriations in the written legislature, and the hurdles entailing an old presidential decree which undermines a special provision in the law relating to the Revised AFP Modernization Program.

THE BREAKDOWN UNDER DND REGULAR APPROPRIATIONS

Here is the programmed budget intended for National Defense under the 2026 General Appropriations Act.
From Republic Act 12314.

In the provided figures above, referencing the 2026 General Appropriations Act encompassing the entire budgetary allotments that the Department of National Defense have for the said fiscal period, the total amount provided for the said department for the said year amounts to the total of Php 305.872 billion, of which Php 292.483 billion of the budget are intended to the financial requirements of the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines under this regular fund.

Going into the specifics, the Philippine Army received the largest portion of the budgetary pie of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with a total allotment of Php 145.161 billion, followed by the Philippine Air Force with a total budgetary allotment of Php 60.634 billion. 

The Philippine Navy received the smallest allotment among the three (3) major branches of the Philippine Armed Forces, with a budgetary allotment of Php 59.929 billion, and completing the amount is GHQ-AFP with Php 26.758 billion.

Other than the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the remaining budgetary allotments of the Department of National Defense go to other agencies attached to the department, including the Office of the Secretary itself. 

That includes self-reliance defense posture efforts of the ‌Government Arsenal (GA), disaster and calamity response units belonging to the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), military support institutions for career enhancement (NDCP), and veterans-related support.

As compared to the allotments provided by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to the Department of National Defense in 2025 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines, there is a significant increase in allotment for the country’s military in 2026, in which the variance in comparison amounts to around Php 32,245,003,000.00, up from 2025’s Php 260.238 billion in allotment. Each of the major branches received an increase in its allotment, encompassing its entire Personnel Services, MOOE, and Capital Outlay expenditure items.

In the breakdown, each of the major service branches of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the General Headquarters, received an increase in allotment for 2026 that comes with the following amounts: Php 6,933,151,000.00 for the Philippine Army, Php 9,060,027,000.00 for the Philippine Air Force, Php 8,894,742,000.00 for the Philippine Navy, and Php 7,357,083,000.00 for the General Headquarters, AFP and AFP-Wide Service Support Units, totalling to the said Php 32.245 billion increase.

As always, the large portion of the budget of the major branches of the Philippine Armed Forces goes to the Personnel Services of its officers and troops, specifically for the salaries and benefits of its currently active personnel plus retirement benefits for those who already reached their mandatory age of exiting from active duty. 

The second largest allotment, as presented on the graph, goes to the maintenance and upkeep of both military hardware and facilities, and the remaining amount goes to their capital outlay projects.

In totality, the Armed Forces of the Philippines saw a significant increase on its allotments, sufficiently aligning to the ongoing sustainment of its personnel and operational requirements, along with its continuous effort of upgrading its facilities, buying capital outlay items that are not part of the Revised AFP Modernization Program, and its transformation to a more capable force aligned with its current posture pointing for external defense deterrence.

REVISED AFP MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

The amount set by the 2026 General Appropriations Act for the Revised AFP Modernization Program comes at around Php 40 billion.

For fiscal year 2026, the budget allotted for the Revised AFP Modernization Program under the General Appropriations Act of the said year is ‌around Php 40,000,000,000.00 - an increase compared to the 2025 allotment of Php 35,000,000,000.00 and similar to the allotment provided by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) for this specific budgetary expenditure item for the year 2024. 

This clearly emphasizes the consistency provided in the amount allotted by ‌Congress for this program.

It is also at this consistency of the provided allotments for the Revised AFP Modernization Program that the Armed Forces of the Philippines found constrained into providing its multi-billion acquisition projects spanning all the three (3) major service branches of the organization, some of which are way beyond the fiscal space provided by the DBM such as the multi-role fighter jet package proposals pushed by the Department of National Defense for the Philippine Air Force.

While the amount provided increases by Php 5,000,000,000.00 compared to the figures provided under the 2025 General Appropriations Act, the overall allotment provided for the year 2026 still comes insufficient from this point of view, especially that there are still projects funded under multi-year arrangements that will probably use the funding under this allotment for the projects to push through. This gives the DND budget planners minimal fiscal space to move and select key programs under this arrangement.

For context, several projects pushed by the Department of National Defense based on their Procurement Monitoring Report encompassing the 2nd semester of year 2026 includes the Frigate Acquisition Project - Full Complement (which calls for the purchase of two (2) additional Miguel Malvar-class frigate/HDF-3200 variant), six (6) anti-submarine warfare helicopters (likely the Leonardo AW-159 Wildcat), additional 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer of the Philippine Army, among others.

While the allotment for the Revised AFP Modernization Program under the 2026 General Appropriations Act remains constant, the overall budget for this object of expenditure actually increased significantly, especially when factoring in the next part of this discussion, this time encompassing the one categorized under Un-programmed Appropriations, itself faced with controversy at the period when the overall budget itself faced full scrutiny at the light of budget-related issues riddled in the year 2025.

UNPROGRAMMED APPROPRIATIONS

Most of the items under the Un-programmed Appropriations got slashed out as the result of the Presidential Veto, leaving the Revised AFP Modernization Program and Support to Foreign-Assisted Projects.

As complementary to the allotments provided for the Revised AFP Modernization Program, the 2026 General Appropriations Act also provided some additional fiscal space for the said item of expenditure through this important yet equally controversial feature of the enacted law - the Un-Programmed Appropriations allotment. 

As discussed previously on various topics on the defense budget, this provision can go into effect if any of the conditions provided for the un-programmed appropriations takes place.

For the Revised AFP Modernization Program, such allotment equates to around Php 50 billion, totalling the allotment that gets set aside for this program under the 2026 General Appropriations Act to around Php 90 billion - the highest allotment there is to-date since the time this article gets published. 

For context, the 2025 General Appropriations Act set aside around Php 75 billion for this expenditure item, while the 2024 General Appropriations Act only set aside Php 50 billion.

This is also the highest one provided under the Un-Programmed Appropriations allotment intended for the Revised AFP Modernization Program to-date, as it is higher by Php 10 billion compared to the 2025 General Appropriations Act’s Php 40 billion, and even higher further than the 2024 General Appropriations Act’s Php 10 billion. 

The increase gives emphasis that while the national government provides the needed budget for the item, its dependency on the government’s revenue performance does not give it full guarantee.

The uncertainty that this provision gives means a lot for any earmarked acquisition projects that the Department of National Defense has in line under the Revised AFP Modernization, aside from the other flexible financing scheme that is also highlighted on the special provisions of its budgetary use as it gets discussed separately on this article writeup. Any ‌progress aligned with the budget allotted under this current year's enactment is likely reflected in the semestral release of the DND’s procurement report.

Enacting the General Appropriations Act for 2026, especially the un-programmed appropriations act, doesn't always come smoothly, as the very core definition of this provision always comes riddled with its own sets of controversy. 

At one point, concerned groups highlighted the constitutionality of simply having the concept of un-programmed appropriations in the enacted law, further implying that any agency plans under these appropriations will fail if there is no available funding to cover them.

At the time this article is written, there is an ongoing deliberation of oral arguments relating to the constitutionality concerns of the un-programmed appropriations before the Supreme Court, as its critics highlight of its concerned legality that might affect the Php 50 billion allotments of the Revised AFP Modernization Program especially if there is a basis that there is a problem on its legality. The question on its decision, however, will probably happen at a time that is beyond what is now provided in this writeup.

While the question on un-programmed appropriations, where the large pie of the Revised AFP Modernization Program allotment, makes it uneasy on the overall implementation of key Acquisition Projects earmarked using this fund which might likely include the most sophisticated weaponry that either of the three major service branches of the organization aims to get, the next point of this discussion will cover another aspect of this topic - which on the special provisions relating various financing schemes.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE REVISED AFP MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

The provided special provisions highlighted the use of Foreign and Domestic Financing Requirements to fund big ticket acquisition projects under the Revised AFP Modernization Program.

In an itemized budget release, such as with the Revised AFP Modernization Program, it always comes with a special provision that is primarily intended for‌ guidance on how the budget will be released by the Department of Budget and Management to fund the modernization-related requirements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines earmarked in this object of expenditure, along with the reporting and posting requirements intended for accounting and auditing reasons as expected on a public office.

While the special provisions on both the release and reporting come as a regular case for the Revised AFP Modernization Program allotment item, this writeup in 2026 now includes something that might, as what several lawmakers pushed, help the planners within the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in their desire to secure far more sophisticated military weaponry and the expensive price tag that it comes with, especially when it is an entire force package.

This said special provision mentioned here refers to the ‘Foreign and Domestic Financing Arrangements’, which itself comes as a complementary mechanism to the allotments set aside for the Revised AFP Modernization Program, as the annual allotments provided by the national government are likely insufficient to other big ticket projects that are beyond the allotments provided on the enacted laws. One key example of a project that might require this arrangement is on a package involving multi-role fighter jets.

Detailing the arrangement as written in the special provisions of the law governing the Revised AFP Modernization Program under the 2026 General Appropriations Act, it says that the Secretary of Finance has the authority to negotiate, contract, and undertake into foreign and domestic financing schemes and arrangements, with consultation provided from the Department of National Defense, which then will undertake the approval directly from the President, with limitations as provided by law.

The ‘limitations as provided’ itself is one big stumbling block in attaining multiple large acquisition projects that go beyond what’s allowed in the budget, as there is another law written way back in the 1970s that explicitly limits the amount needed for the national government to secure a loan or any other credit and financing mechanisms in place. This specific law directly refers to Presidential Decree No. 415, which gives authority to the Secretary of National Defense to undertake defense contracts primarily focused on SRDP.

The provision on the Presidential Decree No. 415 that presents as a stumbling block into attaining better financing schemes lie on Section 3 of the said decree, whereby the President of the Philippines has the power to contract various financing mechanisms not limited to loans and credit lines, of which it should not exceed the amount of around Three Hundred Million United States dollars (US$300 million), of which only equates to Php 18.135 billion as per April 23, 2026 exchange rate.

That limitation, which is even lesser than the budget provided to the Revised AFP Modernization Program under the current and the two previous enacted General Appropriations Act, means that the Armed Forces of the Philippines will probably be stuck into getting the more ‘cost effective’ option in improving its capabilities. This means limiting into securing additional FA-50PH lead-in fighter trainer jets, Sabrah light tanks or their equivalent, and Miguel Malvar-class guided missile frigates.

ENDING NOTE

Infrastructure support is as important as the military hardware purchased.
Image from the 5th Fighter Wing, Philippine Air Force.

The Philippine defense budget for the year 2026 is indeed higher compared to the previous years that the national government set aside for key big ticket acquisition projects needed for the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ various service branches, although the actual requirements provided in each horizon of the Revised AFP Modernization Program are still not met given that the allotments available is still not sufficient for this endeavor.

This comes as the un-programmed appropriations of the Philippine defense budget under the 2026 General Appropriations Act for the Revised AFP Modernization Program come higher than the one allotted for the programmed appropriations, with the former having more than half of the allotments intended for the purchase of intended big-ticket, military hardware-oriented projects that each of the service branches have in mind, in line with the Horizon 3 phase and the previous Horizon 1 and 2 lineups.

Added to this is the provision that welcomes soft loans and similar-crafted financing schemes related to credit lines and flexible payment arrangements, although this still needs adhering to the provisions stipulated in the Presidential Decree No. 415, especially in the ceiling it provides for the Secretary of National Defense in authorizing as to the extent of the amount allowable for multiple acquisition projects to push through. This put key projects with comprehensive packages like the multirole fighter jets in a dilemma.

Aside from the key problems presented on both the budgetary allotment and the financing schemes, one another area not discussed on is on the investment needed for the supporting infrastructure that allows the Philippine Armed Forces to accommodate and properly maintain its expensive military hardware, let alone expand the welfare of its personnel as part of a necessary policy direction governed by a proper process as specified using the DOTMLPF-P analysis.

Ultimately, the 2026 Philippine defense budget presents two different yet justifiable perspectives relative to the overall efforts needed to push for a professional and highly capable Philippine Armed Forces. 

On one hand, they received the largest share for their modernization efforts compared to the previous year's figures, while on the other hand, it presents that the budget, while commendable, is still insufficient. 

Ultimately, it is a clear indicator that investing to ensure this country’s freedom always comes at a cost.

To access the documents, here are the following links below.

1. GAA 2026 - Department of National Defense Budget, under Volume I-A, Chapter XXI (archived).

2. GAA 2026  Revised AFP Modernization Program Budget, under Volume I-B, Chapter XLII (archived).

3. GAA 2026 Un-programmed Appropriations, under Volume I-B, Chapter XLIII (archived).

(c) 2026 PDA.

Published from a station in Eastern Visayas. 

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